Abstract-Islam and Atwood have defined a mechanism for the transport of authentication and authorization material for access control when multicast is used as a delivery technology for content delivery systems. We specify the necessary network and information security needs for the exchange of this material, and present a validation of this security against a specific set of threats.
I. INTRODUCTION
In Content Delivery Networks (CDN), as the customer base increases, a point is reached where the capacity of the network and the content server become inadequate. On extreme cases (e.g., world class sporting events), it is impossible to adequately serve the clientele, resulting in extreme customer frustration. In these circumstances, multicast content delivery is an attractive alternative. However, the issue of maintaining control over the customers is difficult. Based on the work on participant control by Islam and Atwood [1] , we present a validation of the security of the exchanges that are required to ensure adequate control and revenue recovery. This paper is organized as follow: Section II presents previous work. Section III contains the problem statement. After a brief discussion of the token in section IV and EAP in section V, we will explain properties of the specific solution that we have chosen in section VI. Then, following a generic threat model in section VII, we will discuss the corresponding security properties of our solution in section VIII and provide a validation of the security of exchanges with AVISPA in section IX.
II. PREVIOUS WORK

A. Content Delivery
Content Delivery Networks (CDNs) are concerned with moving a digital product (e.g., a video stream) from a Content Server (CS) to an End User (EU). If an End User wishes to purchase a digital product, he/she will contact the Content Provider (CP) and subsequently a trust relationship will be established between the Content Provider and the End User.
On the basis of this trust relationship, an e-commerce transaction will be completed, making use of an additional trust relationship between the Content Provider and a Financial Institution (FI). Once the Content Provider is satisfied that the End User has sufficient funds for the purchase, it will direct the Content Server to deliver the product to the End User.
In this model, the Network Service Provider (NSP) merely provides the mechanism for delivering the packets; it does not participate in the purchase transactions. The data are delivered using a unicast (one-to-one) path between the CS and the EU. As a result, the load on the network increases linearly with the number of users that are simultaneously taking delivery of product(s), as does the load on the Content Server. As the number of End Users that must be served increases, the capacity of the network links and the capacity of the content server must also be increased; eventually a limit on one or the other will be reached. For one class of digital product (where the customer wants the product "immediately"), the only solution is to keep increasing the size of the Content Server, and the capacity of the links close to the Content Server. For another class of digital product ("live" events, where the product is produced at a specific time, e.g., sporting events or other video broadcasts), it is possible to combine the requests of all the End Users into a single request, and use multicast data distribution to satisfy all their needs simultaneously. This can result in significant savings for the Network Service Provider (lower capacity links) and for the Content Provider/Content Server (smaller or fewer servers).
B. IP Multicast
Internet Protocol (IP) Multicast is a technology for delivering data from one (or several) source(s) to multiple recipients. A single packet stream is provided by the sender, and the packets are replicated as necessary within the network to ensure delivery to all interested receivers. As originally specified [2] , any participant is allowed to send (by simply starting to transmit), and any participant is allowed to receive (by simply indicating an interest in a specific "multicast group", and then listening for the resulting packets). This is clearly contrary to the needs of the Content Provider, who loses control over who the clients are. As a result, little use has been made of IP multicast in the general Internet.
C. Secure Multicast Architecture
Atwood [3] has defined an architecture for secure multicast. This architecture contains a Merchant (MR) to take the marketing role from the Content Provider. Given that the trust relationship between the Content Provider and the End users has been severed, the work of establishing a trust relationship with the End Users is devolved to the NSP, since only the NSP (actually, the NSP routers that are closest to the participants, called the Access Routers (ARs)) knows who they are, and can manage the verification of their credentials. See Figure 1 . Islam and Atwood [4] have shown how to introduce authentication, authorization and accounting (AAA) to this architecture for individual multicast sessions, and then how to achieve participant control for receivers [1] and for senders [5] . Their method specifies how to move the authentication material securely from the End User through the Access Router to the verification site, making use of the Network Access Server (NAS) and the AAA Server (AAAS). (The NAS and the AAAS are components in the AAA architecture. An instance of the NAS is co-located with each Access Router, and the AAAS is centrally located within the NSP.) III. PROBLEM STATEMENT Islam and Atwood [1] specify the use of the Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) [6] to carry the authentication material. (More details on EAP are given in Section V.) They note that EAP is organized as a base protocol, with many possible extensions, called EAP "methods". They demonstrate the security of one such method for delivering authentication material. In this paper, we will discuss how the contents of a "token" (which must be generated by the Merchant when the End User orders a digital product, and presented by the End User to the NSP when he/she asks for delivery) is related to the chosen EAP method for authentication and secure communication purposes. Then we chose the most appropriate EAP method (i.e., EAP-FAST), explain how the functionality and security requirements of the architecture are satisfied and eventually validate the security of the exchanges, in the face of specific attacks.
IV. TOKEN IN MULTICAST CONTENT DELIVERY
In secure IP multicast technology, different actors of the multicast content delivery are geographically scattered in a wide area. While no real-time negotiation exists among the actors, they need to communicate with each other to perform different tasks particularly such as pursuing the client's authentication, authorization and accounting. In order to facilitate the communication of different actors, a token [7] is in use and contains AAA information. The token as an application layer piece of information is placed into an EAP packet. The EAP packet in turn is carried using the IGMP-AC [8] framework from the EU host to the AR and then using the Diameter [9] framework from the AR to the EAPS, which is co-located with the AAAS.
The token is tightly coupled to its immediate carrier, the EAP method, in two main ways:
A. Token Functionality
In one hand, the main task of the token is to facilitate the implementation of the authentication, authorization and accounting [10] functionalities. On the other hand, the EAP [6] as an authentication framework has the sub-concept of authentication on its own. Therefore, rather than carrying the token in the payload, the EAP method basically performs the authentication step and uses the content of the token for that purpose.
B. Token Security
The security of the multicast content delivery [11] is composed of the network security and data security. While the token itself has its own security features to provide data security, the carrier of the token and the communication path must provide network security in the architecture. For that reason, since the EAP method carries the token, it needs to have security considerations and preferably establish a secure communication path from the EU to the EAPS.
V. EXTENSIBLE AUTHENTICATION PROTOCOL (EAP)
Regardless of the EAP method to choose, the EAP [6] defines an authentication framework, which typically has three components: the EAP peer, the EAP authenticator and the EAP Server. For multicast content delivery, the three components of the EAP map onto the EU host, the AR (co-located with a NAS) and the "backend authentication server" (co-located with the AAAS) respectively, as shown in Figure 2 .
The EAP was originally designed for use in network access authentication but in the secure IP multicast technology it is used for the multicast session access authentication. The EAP protocol can support different multicast authentication mechanisms and in order to simplify credential management and authentication decision making regarding individual users, the AR acts as a pass-through agent for the back-end authentication server and does not collect any credential information about End Users. In addition to the authentication and functional features of the EAP protocol, it has security considerations to protect the multicast content delivery against some potential attacks and threats. In fact, one of the main differences among various available EAP methods is the way that they protect the exchange of information during and after the authentication procedures. Although the structure of the design and participants dictates some restrictions on picking the right EAP method that matches the design, the more secure the EAP method that we choose, the more confidence we will have in the security of exchanges. Among more than thirty different possible EAP methods, several of them in some manner satisfy our functionality requirements. However, we have a particular set of security requirements for which to satisfy we need to precisely analyze the most likely useful EAP methods and pick the right one. Parham and Atwood [12] have analyzed relevant EAP methods and chosen EAP-FAST [13] as the most appropriate one. We will show how EAP-FAST best suits our design and satisfies our security requirements as our main concern here. (Later on, in section VII, we will refer to the basic structure of the EAP to demonstrate the efficiency of our generic threat model.)
VI. EXTENSIBLE AUTHENTICATION PROTOCOL -FLEXIBLE AUTHENTICATION VIA SECURE TUNNELING EAP-FAST [13] is an EAP method that enables secure communication between the EAP peer and the EAP server by means of the Transport Layer Security (TLS) to establish a secure and mutually authenticated tunnel. It has many functionality and security advantages over other EAP methods.
Although we wish to lay out the effective security aspects of the EAP-FAST method in the main, we will discuss functionality requirements of the design and corresponding properties of EAP-FAST in brief in section VI-A to show that it does not fail to perform its authentication task having enough flexibility in an efficient way.
A. Functionality requirements of the architecture and EAP-FAST corresponding features
In the secure IP multicast technology, the agreed-upon EAP method between the EU and the AR requires a set of properties to be able to perform successfully. It must mutually authenticate the EU and the CP successfully and have enough flexibility to extend the communications for authorization and accounting too, all in a sufficient way. We believe that the EAP-FAST method possess the required functional features.
1) Authentication:
In order to implement the AAA [10] functionalities, the MR issues the token including proper information. Once the EU wants to connect to the multicast session and presents his token to the NSP components authentication procedures start right away. The EU cannot connect to the multicast session unless his identity is verified in advance. In fact, authentication of the EU is not a separate process to be done after a set of EU-NSP negotiations. The authentication step resides within those negotiations and is guaranteed to be successfully done once the EAP-FAST method is implemented correctly.
2) Flexibility: Given the fact that within the architecture, a wide range of various multicast services [14] are provided for a wide range of different end users and many different ways exist to authenticate an end user, the architecture must have a flexible authentication method in accordance with the content of the token. Flexibility of the authentication method is mandatory to extend the communications of the EU and NSP components too. The growing complexity in network infrastructures for routing purposes and also the need to gain authorization and accounting features in the design best shows the need for a flexible authentication method. The EAP-FAST method has the flexibility to enable support for most authentication interfaces. Moreover, the method extends to use multiple existing authentication protocols (if required by the architecture) as well as to enable exchange of authorization and accounting information through its secure TLS channel.
3) Efficiency: With a large deployment of the architecture for on-schedule multicast services, it is likely to have many End Users connecting to a small number of EAP Servers. Moreover, if the EU either lost the first authorization but not the connection to the multicast session or wishes to receive the multicast content on discrete time slots, the authentication method must facilitate a 'fast reconnect' mode to enable the EU to again reach the multicast session quickly to proceed with the next two steps, which are authorization and accounting. So, it is highly desirable to reduce the EAP server's per user requirements to gain efficiency in addition to flexibility. The EAP-FAST method facilitates the use of a single strong shared secret by the EU in order to allow him use that shared secret to secure the TLS tunnel similar to use his username and password to access to the network. This minimizes the device state of the server that the server has to cache and manage. The 'fast reconnect' mode exists in the EAP-FAST method, which reduces resource requirements for the servers too.
B. EAP-FAST security properties
Secure IP multicast is useful only if it makes revenue from valid End Users as well as prevents non-purchasers from taking free advantage of the multicast service. In general, security is essential for that reason. If no precise and reliable security exists, even a small leakage can give the attackers the opportunity to take advantage and devastate the revenue generation.
More discussion and justification on EAP-FAST security properties are provided in the next two sections: VII and VIII.
VII. A GENERIC MODEL OF ATTACKS AND THREATS
In the field of computer networks, the area of security includes two main concepts: the network security concepts (e.g., authenticity, availability) and the information security concepts (e.g., confidentiality, integrity). If an attacker violates any of these concepts, the whole security would be broken.
In order to provide a sufficient network security model as well as an information security model for a protocol, in the first step it is mandatory to define and consider an overall generic model that covers all the known potential attacks and threats.
According to the sections II and V, we are able to determine the type and number of the participants, their roles and the nature of their communications in the secure IP multicast technology. Considering these parameters ensures us that the model will not neglect any potential attack. In fact, there are three main participants in this part of the secure IP multicast technology that we observe to track AAA functionalities: the End User, the Access Router (co-located with a Network Access Server) and the EAP Server (co-located with a AAA Server). Communications of these three participants and the exchanged information between them are subject to various attacks. Since these three participants are not necessarily connected to each other via trusted paths and very likely an intruder is able to reside between them, any kind of attack that needs an attacker to sit between the actors must be considered in the threat model. Specifically, the attacker can listen to the communication from the beginning and gain access to all the public information (e.g., public keys and routing information). Also, the attacker may have the knowledge of old pre-shared secret keys. However, we assume that: 1) All the initiations among the network-side participants have been already done securely and the attacker does not have a chance to access databases of the participants in advance. 2) No attacker has an advance knowledge about the contents of the token. 3) Network routers have installed firewalls and proxies to secure themselves and their communications. 4) The AR has secure communications with the NAS and so does the EAP Server with the AAA Server. 5) The EAP method and even its immediate carriers (the IGMP-AC [8] and Diameter [9] frameworks) are run on top of the network layer and subsequently our model considers any attack that can happen on top of the network Layer. So, communications in the network layer and below are assumed to be done securely. We define the following generic threat model in which the attacker may carry out a number of attacks to violate either the network security concepts or the data security concepts. We believe this model includes the most likely-to-happen attacks and threats during the implementation of AAA functionalities.
• An attacker may attempt to discover the user identity to violate secure authentication by spoofing the authentication traffic.
• An attacker may try to convince the parties that they are talking directly to each other while in a form of active eavesdropping he makes independent connections with the victims and carries out a man-in-the-middle attack.
• Mounting a man-in-the-middle attack, the attacker may try to convince the peer to connect to an untrusted authenticator.
• An attacker may try to modify or spoof EAP packets and subsequently the contents of the token.
• An attacker may replay EAP packets or generate packets with overlapping identifiers to launch a denial of service attack. Obviously, he needs to spoof lower layer indications or Success/Failure packets for that reason.
• An attacker may try to defeat the authentication mechanism by mounting an online and/or offline dictionary attack and determining the decryption keys.
VIII. SECURITY CLAIMS
In this section, we articulate the security provided by the EAP-FAST method to protect the architecture against the previously mentioned vulnerabilities in section VII. We will also justify our proposed security claims.
A. Confidentiality and Integrity
Although an identity exchange is optional within the EAP negotiations of the peer and the authenticator, it is not desirable to entirely omit it due to the complexity that would be added to the EAP packets for routing purposes.
Typically, the EAP-FAST provides message protection by establishing a secure tunnel via Transport Layer Security (TLS) for protecting the authentication method. Moreover, the TLS is employing a strong entropy shared master secret key that results in the confidentiality and integrity protection of the EAP packets.
B. Mutual Authentication and Mitigation of Man-in-theMiddle Attacks
Wrapping EAP within another protocol enables a rogue EAP packet authenticator to attack as a MitM by tunneling EAP to a legitimate server. Where the tunneling protocol does not require peer authentication, an attacker convincing a legitimate EU to connect to it will be able to tunnel EAP packets to a legitimate server. This allows the attacker to successfully establish himself as a MitM, gaining access to the multicast session as well as the ability to decrypt multicast content between the CP and the EU.
EAP-FAST mitigates this attack by using the PAC-Key to mutually authenticate both the EU and the EAPS during phase 1 of the EAP-FAST run. In phase 1, the EAP Server and the EU mutually authenticate each other.
C. Dictionary Attack Resistance
Since password authentication algorithms are known to be vulnerable to dictionary attacks, in general it is recommended to use authentication methods that are resistant to dictionary attacks. However, the EAP-FAST mitigates dictionary attacks by establishing the mutually authenticated and encrypted TLS tunnel to protect even weak credential based authentication methods. Therefore, regardless of the exchanged authentication credentials, EAP-FAST is dictionary attack resistant.
D. Protection against packet modification and forged clear text EAP packets
Since the identifier field in the EAP packet format is only a single octet, it is fairly easy to guess it and allow an attacker to successfully inject or replay EAP packets. If the header of the EAP packet is not protected, the attacker also will be able to modify EAP headers, which can cause packets to be inappropriately discarded or misinterpreted. Moreover, EAP Success and Failure packets are exchanged in clear text. An attacker may try to forge either a Failure packet to convince an EAP peer to disconnect or a Success packet to convince the EAP peer that authentication has succeeded even though the authenticator has not authenticated himself to the peer.
EAP-FAST provides protection against these attacks by providing message confidentiality and integrity. The EAP-FAST peer does not rely upon unprotected EAP Success and Failure messages. It accepts only Success/Failure decisions indicated by a protected mechanism within the EAP-FAST tunnel. As the result of the strong mutual authentication of the EU and the EAP Server, the TLS tunnel is established securely between the EU and the EAP Server and provides a protected path to exchange Success/Failure messages.
E. Mitigation of connecting to an Entrusted Authenticator
EAP-FAST provides the server certificate validation capability as part of the TLS negotiation during which the EAP Server presents a certificate to the EU. In order to determine whether the EAP Server can be trusted or not, the EU has to verify the validity of the certificate by examining the EAP Server's name presented in the certificate.
IX. VALIDATION
Since network security has become a very important and complex field of research nowadays, in this section we would like to apply it to the discussion of exchanging sensitive data over the Internet through multicast communications, finding an appropriate and trustworthy mechanism to map the proposed frameworks and methods to the mechanism and eventually validating them.
A. AVISPA: The Validation Tool
A purely mathematical and analytical discussion on the problem of validating such protocols (more specifically, frameworks and methods) may quickly exhaust the reader. So, we tried to find a tool that can be used to automate the whole work of validating the exchanges within those frameworks and methods.
The AVISPA (Automated Validation of Internet Security Protocols and Applications) Model Checker is a modern security tool to prove the correctness and attack-free working of the Internet security protocols. The tool provides a programming language called High Level Protocol Specification Language (HLPSL) for describing proposed security protocols, frameworks and methods as well as specifying their prospective and intended security features. It is worthwhile to note that mapping the input correctly to the AVISPA model is crucial to demonstrate the output results. Then, the AVISPA randomly considers all possible events to try and track as various simulation scenarios. The tool analyzes them systematically and explores the results whether it finds an attack and reports an unsafe message or finds no attack and reports a safe message indeed. Obviously, the final results are reported according to the set of goals that has to be defined and determined precisely in the HLPSL code. Therefore, a safe result represents that no attacker can break the pre-defined security goals but it does not justify mitigation against other types of vulnerabilities.
The HLPSL code is read by a back-end once the internal translator of the tool translates the code into the Intermediate Format (IF). The AVISPA tool comprises four back-ends as shown in Figure 3: 1) On-the-fly Model-Checker (OFMC) employs several symbolic techniques to explore the state space in a demand-driven way. proximates the intruder knowledge by using regular tree languages and rewriting to produce under and over approximations. This list may later be extended with new back-ends for other purposes. However, since more than 85% of the attacks and threats can usually be found by the first two back-ends (according to the AVISPA guidelines) and the other two are not designed to track our particular security goals, we used the CL-AtSe back-end in addition to the default invoked back-end, OFMC.
B. The Developed AVISPA Model
In this section we describe how we modeled the proposed IETF document of the EAP-FAST method with HLPSL language to meet the AVISPA validation requirements.
• The EAP-FAST method uses a Protected Access Credential (PAC) to establish a secure TLS tunnel in which intended client credentials will be verified. EAP-FAST has two main phases and an optional phase 0. In Phase 1, the EU and the EAP Server uses the PAC to establish the TLS tunnel and in Phase 2, the EU credentials are exchanged, inside the secure tunnel. Typically, in Phase 0, the PAC can be provisioned manually or dynamically. Phase 0 is outside the scope of the IETF document [13] . It does not have any effect on the nature of the two other phases either and has to be done before the first authentication step starts. Therefore, there is no need to consider provisioning the PAC in our model. • The HLPSL language is a role-based language, which means we determine the sequence of actions and properties of each kind of participants in a module called basic role. Here, we define two general types of basic roles: the role peer and the role authentication server; which gives us the ability to describe the two required agents and the way of exchanging security sensitive data between those agents. Agents are the Peer (which represents the EU) and the Server (which represents the EAP Server). A definition of the role is given as: 'played by', where we specify the agent and its local variable(s).
• We defined global variables for each role as well as local variables and constants. Usually, transmission channels (sending) to and (receiving) from other agents and public keys are defined as global variables while different nonces, session IDs, hash functions and secret keys are defined as local variables. Local variables may transfer between the agents through the transmission channels. This is the actual way that we naturally modeled exchange of nonces into the HLPSL language.
• In HLPSL, local variables have the ability to be changed and transferred but they cannot be shared. Yet, it is possible to share a constant value as well as to negotiate on the value of a global variable and share that one whenever we require roles to have pre-shared knowledge (e.g., a shared key). In fact, the PAC in the EAP-FAST is modeled in the HLPSL by means of a global variable 'Kar' that is defined as a public key to enable us to have a protected access information in our AVISPA model. • In the transition section, for each role we specified different state(s) to be able to model communications of the two agents, generating new string of bytes mostly as nonces, sending and receiving credentials, performing algebraic operations as well as hashing on nonces; all regarding the secret key generation and exchange authentication of the agents and establishment of the secure TLS tunnel. As shown in Figure 4 , exactly the same steps as in a real run of the EAF-FAST are done in our model to provide the strong mutual authentication and the secure TLS tunnel. As a matter of fact, the verification of the certificates is the strong mutual authentication and the exchange of the fresh secret keys is the establishment of the secure TLS tunnel, which enables both agents to transfer further intended information (for authorization and accounting purposes) in a secure encrypted way.
It is worthwhile to note that our model optionally sends the server certificate to the peer for verification in order to model the optional authentication of the server in the EAP-FAST method.
• We assigned state numbers to reflect the intended order of the send and receive events. That is, we modeled the order of exchanging information of the EAP-FAST in the HLPSL language and have them performed in the same order as they are done in the actual EAP-FAST method (see Figure 4) . As an example, the EU first has to initiate an EAP session with his request to the EAP Server and receives the response back, then he can start establishment of the TLS tunnel. Therefore, it is required to assign a lower number to the first state and a higher number to the next one for both of the agents to follow the order.
• In order to have one whole protocol session, we defined a composed role, which instantiates one instance of each basic role actually by gluing them together so that they execute together in parallel with interleaving semantics. This enables us also to define an intruder session with certain knowledge of the public symmetric keys, channels and agents. This is a great capability of the AVISPA to execute more than one session in parallel and place an intruder in a session to simulate various events and eventually justify the validation results. In fact, the AVISPA looks for any possible scenario that can result in violating any of the security goals. Therefore, a safe summary result strongly claims that the protocol is attack free according to the model.
C. Specifying the AVISPA Security Goals
In order to have a meaningful validation of the security properties by AVISPA, in addition to model the protocol itself with HLPSL, it is required to specify the security goals in HLPSL too. It can be done by augmenting the transitions of the basic roles with so-called goal facts. Any kind of security sensitive data that has to be exchanged needs an observation from the AVISPA compiler to track the confidentiality, integrity and safe transmission of the data. Clearly, the AVISPA compiler developed to do so in its own way. Once we observed the AVISPA about the goal facts, we need to then assign them a meaning by describing them in the HLPSL goal section. This will clarify what combination of such facts indicates an attack.
From our perspective of view as a user, we believe that we correctly requested the AVISPA model checker to witness the secrecy of the intended data carefully and stated the goal section in the HLPSL properly according to the generic attack model (in section VII). In the goal section of our HLPSL code (see Figure 5 ), we explicitly ask the AVISPA model checker to validate the secrecy of both the peer and the server's fresh secret keys, which ensures the intended security of further communications (in the TLS channel); and also to validate the mutual authentication of both agents on their own nonces, which ensures the strong mutual authentication. Therefore, we claim that the final safe report is accurately obtained.
The witness and request events are goal facts related to authentication of an agent. We used them to check whether or not an agent is right in believing that its intended peer that is actually present in the current session, has reached a definite state in its transition section and agrees on a certain value, which usually is a fresh nonce. The fresh nonce is actually generated by each agent to authenticate the other one.
In fact, we used AVISPA to validate two main classifications of security goals:
• secrecy
• authenticity The secrecy goal confirms the inability of a third party to discover even a part of the contents exchanged between a sender and a receiver that is supposed to be kept secret. The authenticity goal verifies a distinguishing identifier (e.g., a newly-generated nonce encrypted by a pseudo random function) claimed by or for an agent, which may be a peer in a communication or the source of some data as a server. The verification is achieved presenting authentication information (credentials) that corroborates the binding between the agent and the identifier.
Given the very general concept that these two main security goals are dominating and the possibility of using them in accordance with any kind of exchanged data with choosing any agent in the model as the sender and receiver of the data, we believe they are capable of validating the protocol against a wide range of attacks and threats including what we proposed in section VII.
As a simple example on secrecy where the goal facts assert which values should be kept secret between whom and in the goal section they are described, any time the intruder learns a secret value which is not explicitly a secret between him and someone else, it should be considered an attack.
D. The AVISPA Results
We developed our code in HLPSL language to model the EAP-FAST method. Given the set of goal facts and goal section that we have defined for our AVISPA model, no attack is found by the two OFMC and CL-AtSe back-ends and the summary results are safe. This shows that considering our generic threat model, the EAP-FAST method in reality mitigates against all those potential attacks and threats. In this paper, we discussed that the EAP-FAST best suits the secure IP multicast technology to satisfy the set of functional and security requirements. We also modeled the method by means of the HLPSL description language and proposed a generic threat model accordingly, to validate the intended security properties of the EAP-FAST method successfully by AVISPA. Plans for the future could be discovering the functionality requirements of the EAP-FAST in detail and precisely specifying the contents of the token to add an acceptable level of functionality to the multicast content delivery as the main project.
